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The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4494
This paper contributes to the literature that explores 
the link between regulatory governance and sector 
performance. The paper develops an index of 
regulatory governance and estimates its impact on 
sector performance, showing that indeed regulation 
and its governance matter. The authors use two unique 
databases: (i) the World Bank Performance Database, 
which contains detailed annual data for 250 private and 
public electricity companies in Latin America and the 
Caribbean; and (ii) the Electricity Regulatory Governance 
Database, which contains data on several aspects of the 
governance of electricity agencies in the region. The 
authors run different models to explain the impacts 
of change in ownership and different characteristics 
of the regulatory agency on the performance of the 
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utilities. The results suggest that the mere existence of a 
regulatory agency, regardless of the utilities’ ownership, 
has a significant impact on performance. Furthermore, 
after controlling for the existence of a regulatory agency, 
the ownership dummies are still significant and with 
the expected signs. The authors propose an experience 
measure in order to identify the gradual impact of the 
regulatory agency on utility performance. The results 
confirm this hypothesis. In addition, the paper explores 
two different measures of governance, an aggregate 
measure of regulatory governance, and an index 
based on principal components, including autonomy, 
transparency, and accountability. The findings show that 
the governance of regulatory agencies matters and has 
significant effects on performance. 
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According to an increasing body of empirical evidence, institutions matter for growth and 
development (Aron, 2000; Rodrik, 2004). The infrastructure sector generally, and the 
electricity sector in particular, are not an exception to this finding. Research on the 
subject has associated better sector performance, represented by higher levels of 
electricity generation per capita, to the governance of institutions responsible for the 
conduct of regulatory decisions (Cubbin and Stern, 2006). 
 
Despite the different approaches in the design of regulatory institutions, a separate 
agency from the government with reasonable levels of autonomy and technical expertise 
has emerged as the model and paradigm of a regulatory institution. The Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC) region has adopted that regulatory model. Beginning with 
Chile’s National Energy Commission in 1978 and ending in 2001 with Barbados’ Fair 
Trading Commission, the region presents a diverse spectrum of regulatory authorities and 
practices, today 70 percent of countries in the region have a separate entity—with varying 
degrees of independence—to regulate electricity markets (LAC Electricity Regulatory 
Governance Database, The World Bank, 2007). 
 
Even though more than 10 years have passed since the majority of LAC countries 
established independent agencies, the study of their governance and of its impact on 
sector performance has been limited and poorly focused. With some exceptions (Correa 
et al., 2006; Brown et al, 2007; Guasch and Spiller, 1999), the research on the subject has 
limited the assessment of regulatory agencies to a few governance indicators, specifically 
focusing on their independence from political authorities, and many of them have been 
case studies. This is particularly the case of the electricity sector of the LAC region 
where, beyond specific agency-based case studies, regional analyses that assess 
institutional design and governance behavior do not exist. 
 
In a previous paper (Andres et al, 2007b), we attempted to fill that gap. Based on selected 
literature on the subject, we defined and assessed electricity’s agencies governance 
through four main characteristics of their governance design: (i) autonomy from political 
authorities and of their management and regulatory competencies; (ii) transparency 
before institutional and non-institutional stakeholders; (iii) accountability to the three 
branches of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary); and (iv) tools and 
capacities for the conduct of the regulatory policy and the improvement of its institutional 
development. We defined regulatory governance as the agency’s institutional design and 
structure that allows it to carry its functions as an independent regulator.  
 
Although we tried to capture as many governance variables as possible, some caveats 
need to be taken into account. Our assessment of the governance of regulatory agencies 
was based on the regulatory and institutional inputs that agencies need to implement their 
procedures and tools, but does not consider the outputs or outcomes of agencies’ 
regulation.
1 In other words, the measurement of agencies’ governance is not an indicator 
 
1 This has been the overwhelming mechanism used by the literature on the subject to assess the independence 
and other attributes of regulatory agencies. Although, ideally, we would like to include the effectiveness of   - 3 -
                                                                                                                                                            
of the effectiveness of the use of their regulatory instruments (such as the methodology to 
calculate tariff readjustment) or the quality of stakeholders’ involvement in public 
consultations. Rather it is aimed at capturing the institutional conditions necessary to 
achieve good regulation regardless of their scope and impact on the sector’s performance 
(Correa  et al., 2006). While we considered some practices (informal regulation) of 
agencies’ governance, the indicators used are referred to the operationalization of 
particular aspects of agencies’ governance but did not measure their full effectiveness.  
 
In this paper we combine our data on electricity agencies’ governance with data collected 
at the company level and assess the impact of regulatory agencies on utility performance 
in the electricity sector of the LAC region. This research fills a gap in the literature on the 
subject as previous attempts to interrelate the notions of governance of agencies and 
performance of the electricity sector have focused on very limited factors, affecting the 
scope and explanatory power of the research. On the governance side, previous research 
has only focused on the existence of an agency, a legal framework, or particular aspects 
of its governance, mainly its autonomy, emphasizing formal attributes. On the 
performance side, only electricity generation per capita was used as an indicator related 
to governance (Stern and Cubbin, 2005). Estache and Rossi have recently written a paper 
exploring the relationship between the establishment of an agency and the efficiency of 
the utilities as well as the welfare of the consumers (Estache and Rossi, 2007).  
 
In this paper, we go further as we create an aggregate index with different critical aspects 
of the governance of regulatory agencies and we relate and relate it to several factors that 
represent the performance of utilities and assess its impact on sector performance. Based 
on the hypothesis that agencies (and their governance) have a positive impact on 
performance, we develop a methodology where we ran different models in order to 
explain the contributions of change in ownership and different characteristics of the 
regulatory agency and of its governance on the performance of the utilities. The results 
suggest that the mere existence of a regulatory agency, independent of the utilities’ 
ownership has a significant impact on performance. Furthermore, after controlling for the 
existence of a regulatory agency, the ownership dummies are still significant and display 
the expected signs. We also proposed an experience measure in order to identify the 
gradual impact of the agency on performance. Our results confirm this hypothesis.  
 
In measuring governance, we explore two different approaches: (i) we use an aggregated 
measure of regulatory governance (Electricity Regulatory Governance Index, ERGI); and 
(ii) we decompose several dimensions of agencies governance into three main principal 
components related to both informal and formal aspects of autonomy, transparency, and 
accountability; we also include agencies’ attributes in setting tariff structure and levels as 
an independent variable together with the formal and informal dimensions of autonomy, 
transparency, accountability, and tools. The results suggest that governance matters and 
that it has significant impacts on performance when we simulated a standard deviation in 
each of these indexes. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: The next section is a review of the literature on 
institutional design of independent agencies as well as on the impact of private sector 
participation on sector performance. The third section proposes an analytical framework 
for regulatory governance. Section 4 presents the empirical approach for measuring the 
impacts on performance and section 5 describes the data. Section 6 provides a detailed 
 
the different institutional arrangements on sector performance and on institutional quality outcomes, the 
cross-regional nature of our research and the limited resources to undertake this task convinced us of this 
approach as the most convenient.   - 4 -






2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This work will explore the relationship between two different literatures. The first is 
related to the impact of private sector participation on sector performance. The second is 
the literature related to the measurement of the governance of regulatory agencies. There 
is little knowledge on the relationship between these two. Some exceptions include a 
recent paper done by Sirtaine et al. (2004) and Estache and Rossi (2007). 
 
The literature on change in ownership, most of it related to ownership change, has 
focused on other sectors than electricity, such as in transportation (for example, 
Ramamurti, 1996; and Laurin and Bozec, 2000), telecommunications (for example, Ros, 
1999; and Ramamurti, 1996) and manufacturing (for example, Frydman et al., 1999; and 
Boarman and Vining, 1989). In the case of privatization of the distribution of electricity, 
in particular for Latin American Countries, there is no comprehensive reference. Most of 
the articles that analyze this issue respond to case-studies or a country analysis (For 
examples, see Galal et al., 1994; and La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999), and only the 
telecommunications sector has been more deeply analyzed in the region (see for example 
Ros and Banerjee, 2000). Some exceptions in these sectors are Estache and Rossi (2004) 
for the case of Electricity Distribution.  
 
For the case of the electrical sector in Latin America, there are broad descriptions of the 
reforms in the sector but no empirical analysis (see for example, Millan et al., 2001; 
Dussan, 1996; and Estache and Rodriguez Pardina, 1998). Information on Latin America 
can also be found in studies on developing countries (see for example Bacon and Besant-
Jones, 2001). The recent review of Joskow (2003) summarizes the lessons learned across 
countries in the electricity market. 
 
The lack of available systematic data has prevented the development of empirical 
analysis in the subject. Nevertheless, some country analysis has been conducted. For 
example, Chisari et al. (1997) built a general equilibrium model in order to analyze the 
impact of privatizations in Argentina between 1993 and 1995. Among regional empirical 
research, Estache and Rossi (2004) analyze the impact of change in ownership on labor 
productivity and prices. They also evaluated how the different regulatory environments 
affected these outcomes in the region. They found that private firms use significantly less 
labor to produce a given bundle of output than public firms. Using similar data, Rossi 
(2004) also analyzed the firms’ operating and maintenance expenses. He found that these 
costs did not change significantly after the reform, and argued that outsourcing, in part, 
may bias the results for the decrease in labor usage and labor productivity. 
 
The literature on the governance of agencies in infrastructure has centered on the 
independent regulator model, which is reflected in the United States (US) independent 
commissions. An institutional design model that emphasizes agencies that make 
decisions independently from the Executive branch, are subject to the accountability of 
the Parliament, and budgeting autonomy has emerged as the paradigm of an 
infrastructure regulator. The first attempts to evaluate infrastructure regulatory agencies   - 5 -
made use of frameworks to assess the independence of Central Banks (Stern and Cubbin, 
2005; and Oliverira, Machado, Novaes, and Ferreira, 2005). This fact explains the 
original emphasis on agencies’ independence and the reduced significance given to other 
aspects of their functioning such as accountability and transparency. The evolution of the 
subject and the initial stages of agencies functioning changed the original approach and 
introduced more comprehensive approaches to assessment.  
 
The literature has focused on three main aspects of their design: a) their independence 
from political authorities and the autonomy of their management, b) mechanisms to make 
them accountable (both to other branches of government and to the public), and c) the 
transparency of both their rule- and decision-making procedures. Within these categories, 
indicators range from simple measures to determine, for instance, independence (such as 
the legal instruments that created the agency) to more sophisticated mechanisms aimed, 
for example, at improving the quality of regulation (such as Regulatory Impact Analysis). 
 
Research on the regulatory governance of independent agencies has evolved and 
changed. Despite the original focus on independence, a growing body of literature has 
been using more comprehensive approaches to address their institutional design. Good 
examples of this trend are the works of Correa et al. (2006), Brown et al. (2006), and 
Andres et al. (2007), which approach the assessment of independent regulatory agencies 
through the classic lens of autonomy, transparency, and accountability, but include a 
wide array of indicators within these variables as well as innovative tools to understand 
and assess their functioning. Furthermore, this literature focuses not only on the formal 
aspects of regulation (provisions existing in agencies’ statues and laws) but also on 
informal regulation (aspects related to the implementation of the provisions’ 
components). This approach is useful as it recognizes the broad nature of the role of 
regulatory agencies: they are not only institutions responsible for driving investment in 
infrastructure but also are decentralized administrative bodies in charge as such of 
delivering public service to citizens. 
 
The following paragraphs review some of the literature on the subject. Stern and Holder 
(1999) develop a framework to assess the governance of economic regulators in several 
sectors (electricity, natural gas, telecom, transport, and water) in six developing Asian 
economies. Their appraisal scheme is composed of two variables related to the formal 
(institutional design) and informal (regulatory processes and practices) aspects of 
regulation. Results indicate middle-low levels of regulatory governance for all the sectors 
and countries included in the research. Moreover, results are relatively uniform by 
country across the industries, with the exception of India. Gilardi (2002) develops an 
independence index, covering regulators from five sectors in seven European countries. 
The author attempts to prove that governments delegate their regulatory powers and 
competences to independent regulatory agencies to enhance the credibility of their 
policies. Johannsen (2003) measures the formal independence of energy regulators in 
eight European countries. Using information collected through surveys, she assesses the 
independence of energy regulatory agencies through four main variables: (i) 
independence from government; (ii) independence from stakeholders; (iii) independence 
in the decision-making process; and (iv) organizational autonomy. The survey’s 
questions reflect formal regulation with no consideration for the practices of regulatory 
agencies.  
 
Gutierrez (2003) develops a Regulatory Framework Index (RFI) to asses the evolution of 
regulatory governance in the telecommunications sector during the period 1980–2001 in 
25 LAC countries. According to Gutierrez, the RFI shows that most countries embraced   - 6 -
strong regulatory reforms along the lines recommended by experts and practitioners. In 
another article, Gilardi (2005) proposes three ways of evaluating independent regulators: 
the impact of an agency’s independence on regulatory quality, an agency’s respect for 
accountability standards, and the impact of agency’s independence on the performance of 
the market it regulates.  
 
Few have been the efforts to measure the practices of agencies’ governance, in addition 
to their formal design. In addition to Stern and Holder’s attempt to measure informal 
regulation, Magetti (2005) develops a framework to assess the real independence of 
regulatory agencies. His framework is composed of two main features: (i) the degree of 
self-determination of agencies’ preferences; and (ii) the degree to which those 
preferences are translated into regulatory acts. He applies his approach to the Swiss 
Federal Banking Commission (SFBC), finding that the SFBC has higher levels of 
informal independence from political authorities than from the regulatees. With regards 
to the degree of influence of relevant actors on the legislative process, Magetti finds the 
informal independence of the SFBC to be quite low, particularly vis-à-vis political 
decision makers. 
 
Three comprehensive approaches to assessing the governance of regulatory agencies have 
been those developed by Correa et al. (2006), Brown et al. (2006), and Andres et al. 
(2007b). Correa et al. provide a detailed analysis of Brazilian regulatory agencies. The 
authors select four aspects of agencies’ governance and, based on information collected 
through surveys, construct three indexes. The first index, the Regulatory Governance 
Index, is the base-line indicator and represents the most comprehensive dataset of all the 
indexes. The second index, the Parsimonious Index, captures those variables of the 
survey that are less subjective. The third index, the Facto Index, is related to actual 
practices of regulatory agencies. The report finds that independence and accountability 
are more developed than regulatory means and instruments (particularly qualified 
personnel and regulatory tools) and decision-making procedures (particularly with 
respect to those mechanisms that can guarantee consistency of decisions and reduce 
arbitrariness). It also finds that there is a clear difference between federal and state 
regulatory agencies, with the former achieving higher results in the autonomy, decision-
making, and decision tools components of the Regulatory Governance Index. 
 
Brown et al. (2006) develop a framework to assess the effectiveness of a regulatory 
system. They aim to provide the policy-maker with different types of evaluations (quick, 
mid-level, and in-depth) to carry out these assessments. The authors include aspects 
related not only to the governance of the regulatory system (independence, transparency, 
and accountability of the regulator) but also to the substance or content of the regulation 
(decisions about tariff levels and structures, network access conditions for new and 
existing customers). Using the independent regulator model as the benchmark of analysis, 
they select 10 principles that should be followed in order to create an independent 
regulatory agency. The principles are accompanied by standards that establish the details 
for their implementation. 
 
In Andres et al. (2007b) we evaluate and benchmark electricity agencies of the region 
based on four main attributes of their governance: autonomy, transparency, 
accountability, and tools/capacities. Using a unique database, we develop an index of 
regulatory governance and rank all the agencies in the LAC countries. The index is an 
aggregate number of the evaluation of four key governance characteristics: autonomy, 
transparency, accountability, and regulatory tools, including not only formal aspects of 
regulation but also indicators related to actual implementation. Based on 18 different   - 7 -
                                                
indexes, we analyze the positions of agencies with regard to different aspects of their 
regulatory governance, considering not only performance in each variable but also scores 
in the different components of each category. This evaluation allows for the identification 
of particular country shortcomings regarding governance, and indicates needed 
improvements.  
 
A few papers have focused on the relationship between regulatory characteristics and 
performance. Sirtaine et al. (2004) that define a Regulatory Quality Index, considering 
three key aspects of regulatory quality: legal solidity, financial strength, and decision-
making autonomy. Despite their small sample sizes, three out of the four models show 
that the regulatory quality variables are significant in overall terms, and that are on their 
own capable of explaining 20-25 percent of the internal rate of return of private 
investment in infrastructure projects in LAC. More recently, Estache and Rossi (2007) 
explored the causal relation between the establishment of a regulatory agency and the 
performance of the electricity sector. They exploit a unique dataset comprising firm-level 
information on a representative sample of 220 electric utilities from 51 developing and 
transition countries for the years 1985 to 2005. Their results indicate that regulatory 
agencies are associated with more efficient firms and with higher consumer welfare. 
 
3. REGULATORY GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
 
 
We base on our work on the governance of electricity agencies. In our paper, we selected 
a theoretical framework of analysis and designed a survey that was completed by 
nineteen countries of the region. The evaluation of agencies’ governance was done 
through several indexes that reflect different dimensions of agencies’ organization and 
functioning.  
 
Building upon Correa et al. (2006) and the majority of the research on the subject, we 
evaluate the electricity agencies’ governance structure. We develop two related indexes 
of regulatory governance--an aggregated measure (Electricity Regulatory Governance 
Index, ERGI) and a principal components based governance index that includes 
autonomy, transparency, and accountability-and evaluate the impact of agencies’ 
governance on the performance of the sector. Exploring this dimension is the objective of 
this section.  
 
Our conceptual framework or benchmark model of analysis is the independent regulator 
model. This decision was based on two main factors. The first factor is related to the use 
of independent regulatory agencies as the model for electricity regulation in the majority 
of the region. According to their database,
2 almost 70 percent of the countries in the 
region have adopted a separate regulator from the line ministry as the preferred 
institutional arrangement for electricity regulation. The second factor is related to 
empirical evidence that considers the independent regulator model as the most effective 
approach in the regulation of privatized infrastructure industries (Brown et al., 2006).  
 
Following our work on the subject, we conceive regulatory agencies as both public 
bodies that are part of the public administration—and as such in charge of the delivery of 
public services—and as instruments to implement regulatory policies. This approach to 
assessing electricity agencies’ governance led us to consider not only existing research on 
 
2 Based on the information collected through the surveys submitted by countries, Andres et al. (2007b) 
designed a database composed of 46 electricity regulators (including both federal and national regulators).    - 8 -
infrastructure agencies’ designs (documented in the literature review), but also notions 
and tools of public sector governance applied to decentralized structures of government. 
 
The regulatory governance of independent agencies is defined and assessed according to 
four variables of their design and functioning: autonomy, transparency, accountability, 
and tools. Each of the variables, with the exception of accountability, is composed of 
several elements, reflecting different aspects of autonomy, transparency, and tools. 
Variables for agencies’ governance reflect not only formal aspects (procedures and tools 
established in the agency’s statute or laws) but also the practices that derive from their 
implementation (informal regulation). Indicators for the informal elements of autonomy, 
accountability, and transparency represent the operationalization of some aspects of these 
variables. The variable “tools” is excluded from this analysis as the mere existence of 
these instruments implies their actual implementation. 
 
The first variable of agencies’ regulatory governance is autonomy. We define autonomy 
as the procedures, mechanisms, and instruments aimed at guaranteeing the independence 
of the agency from political authorities (political autonomy), the autonomous 
management of its resources (managerial autonomy), and the regulation of the sector 
(regulatory autonomy). Political autonomy represents the level of independence of the 
agency from government authorities and is measured by indicators that reflect the 
autonomy of the agency’s decision-making. Managerial autonomy involves the freedom 
of the agency to determine the administration of its resources and is measured by 
indicators that reflect the powers of the agency to determine its organizational structure 
and the use of its budget. Regulatory autonomy is defined by the extension of the 
agency’s regulatory powers in the electricity sector and is represented by indicators that 
capture agencies’ responsibilities in electricity regulation. 
 
The second aspect of agency’s governance is accountability, which we define as the 
procedures, mechanisms, and instruments aimed at guaranteeing an adequate level of 
control of the agency’s budget and performance by political authorities, namely the 
Parliament. Despite the successful use of mechanisms to assess the performance of 
agencies by governments, we prioritize the accountability of the agency before the 
Parliament. We based this decision on two main reasons: First, the fact that the 
institutional design model we follow is that of a US independent commission, where 
agencies are subject to parliamentary oversight. Second, the history of political 
interference of LAC line ministries in utilities underscores the importance of including 
other political stakeholders, such as the Parliament, in the regulatory process. We 
consider an institutional perspective of accountability only as defined by the relationships 
of the agency with the three branches of government (Executive, Legislative and the 
Judiciary) and do not further dissect the variable.  
 
The third variable is transparency. We define transparency as the procedures, 
mechanisms, and instruments aimed at guaranteeing the disclosure and publication of 
relevant regulatory and institutional information, the participation of stakeholders in the 
agency’s regulatory decisions and decision-making, and the application of rules aimed at 
governing the integrity and behavior of agency officials. We cover two dimensions of 
transparency: social transparency and institutional transparency. Social transparency is 
composed of indicators related to the involvement of non-institutional actors in the 
agency’s policy-making, including their access to the agency’s information. Institutional 
transparency is composed of indicators related to the transparent management of the 
agency that are not directly linked to stakeholder involvement, and includes issues such   - 9 -
                                                
as the publication of the agency’s annual report, the use of norms of ethics, and the 
existence of public exams for hiring employees. 
 
The fourth variable is tools, which we define as the instruments and mechanisms that 
contribute to the strengthening of different aspects of an agency’s functioning and the 
quality of its regulations. We include not only regulatory tools (e.g. mechanisms for tariff 
revision, regulatory accountability, instruments for monitoring technical standards), but 
also those instruments aimed at improving the institutional quality of the agency, or 
institutional tools (e.g.  audits of agencies’ accounts, electronic files for consumer 
complaints, performance-based payments for employees, regulatory quality standards). 
This is the only variable whose analysis does not consider its formal and informal 
aspects; the sole existence of agencies’ tools implies their actual implementation. 
 
The pooling together of these indicators defines the Electricity Regulatory Governance 
Index (ERGI). This index was the main indicator in Andres et al. (2007b) and it is 
composed of 74 questions. The index is a single average of their seven main indexes: (i) 
formal autonomy; (ii) informal autonomy; (iii) formal transparency; (iv) informal 
transparency; (v) formal accountability; (vi) informal accountability; and (vii) tools. The 
rankings across the regulatory agencies were tested with other weights across the 
indexes
3; however, the rakings were similar to the one chosen in the paper as a simple 
average of the indexes. 
 
According to our results, the region shows a reasonable governance design of their 
regulatory agencies. Nevertheless, the implementation of the independent regulator 
model still faces several challenges. This is particularly evident in political autonomy and 
in the informal aspects of governance, where the region shows the largest number of 
countries with the lowest scores. In our main index, ERGI, Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, 
Bolivia, and Peru show the best results and Ecuador, Honduras, and Chile the worst 
performances. The rest of the countries vary according to the different indexes. Table 1 
presents their main results and rankings. 
 
 
3 Among other robust analysis the paper assigned different weights to the seven indexes. First they put double 
weight to the variables related to set and enforce tariffs. As many sector specialists argue, this is, per se, the 
main attribute of a regulatory agency. A second approach was based on the Principal Component Analysis 
approach. The methodology develops a composite index by defining a real valued function over the relevant 
variables objectively. The principle of this method lies in the fact that when different characteristics are 
observed about a set of events, the characteristic with higher variation explains a higher proportion of the 
variation in the dependent variable compared to a variable with lesser variation in it. Therefore, the issue is 
one of finding weights to be given to each of the concerned variables determined on the principle that the 
objective is to maximize the variation in the linear composite of these variables. In other words, this approach 
allows for identifying patterns in data, and expressing the data in such a way as to highlight their similarities 
and differences.  TABLE 1: National Regulatory Agencies in the ERGI and the four main indexes 
 
ERGI AUTONOMY  TRANSPARENCY  ACCOUNTABILITY  TOOLS 
 
Position  Score Position Score  Position  Score Position  Score  Position  Score 
Argentina  7 0.80  6 0.85  8  0.71 10  0.71  8  0.83 
Barbados  8 0.76  10 0.82  8  0.71  4  0.83  10  0.59 
Bolivia  3 0.84  1 0.912  5 0.80  3  0.84  4  0.78 
Brazil  2 0.85  5 0.87  6  0.79  2  0.87  2  0.90 
Chile  18  0.56  19 0.57  12 0.63  16 0.50  12 0.52 
Colombia  9 0.75  18 0.67  5  0.8  6  0.79  7  0.71 
Costa Rica  12 0.74  8 0.84  7  0.74 10  0.71  10  0.59 
D. Republic  10 0.75  3 0.90  8  0.71  8  0.74  12  0.51 
Ecuador  17 0.60  17 0.70  15  0.57  12  0.65  13  0.40 
El Salvador  5 0.82  7 0.84  2  0.86  5  0.81  7  0.71 
Guatemala  6 0.79  12 0.80  13  0.62  2  0.87  1 0.93 
Honduras  19 0.56  16 0.70  16 0.53  14 0.54  14 0.37 
Jamaica  15 0.72  14 0.78  10  0.68  13  0.62  3  0.86 
Mexico  14 0.72  15 0.75  4  0.83  7  0.75  14 0.37 
Nicaragua  11 0.74  2 0.91  11  0.66  9  0.72  9  0.63 
Panama  16 0.63  11 0.81  14  0.59  15  0.52  11  0.54 
Peru  4 0.83  4 0.90  3  0.85  7  0.75  3  0.86 
Trinidad & T  1 0.88  9 0.82  1 0.92  1  0.97  5 0.76 
Uruguay  13 0.72  13 0.80  9  0.69  11  0.67  6  0.72 
 
 
A Source: L C Electricity Regulatory Governance Database. The World Bank. 2007. Extracted from Andres et al. (2007b). 
 
4. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
 
Ideally, to evaluate the impact of private sector participation and the characteristics of the 
regulation on the performance of a utility, privatized utilities should be compared to the 
performance of its “counterfactual”, a comparable firm in a similar environment that is 
still operated by the government and is not regulated. In most cases, it is hard to identify 
a comparable firm; hence, most of the literature compares the evolution of selected 
indicators before and after the change in ownership and regulation. 
  
The majority of the literature focuses mainly on the impact of change in ownership. For 
these evaluations, two methodologies have been identified. The first methodology began 
with Megginson et al. (1994); and several subsequent studies have used the same 
approach to measure means and medians of the periods before and after change and to 
test the significance of the change between the periods. This methodology has also been 
applied in studies that considered different samples of state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
among countries and compared their performance to privatized firms. The second 
methodology is found in another branch of literature that assumes privatization policies to 
be an intervention. Following the literature of program evaluation (see Heckman et al., 
1985), this approach proposes a dummy for those periods where the SOE was privately 
owned, and checks the significance of this dummy, as well as the significance of various 
interactions specific to each paper (for example, Boardman and Vining,1989 and Ros, 
1999). 
 
  - 10 -This paper follows the second methodology. We start with a simple version of the model, 
as specified below:  
 
( ) ∑ + + + + =
ij
ijt ij ij ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt D X PRIV X PRIV y υ φ γ δ β ) * ( * * * ln           (1) 
 
where  ijt y are the variables of interest (outputs, number of employees, labor productivity, 
efficiency, quality, coverage, and prices). The main variables in this model are the 
dummy , that is equal to one if the utility   of country  ijt PRIV i j  has private ownership at 
time   and Xijt, that is a vector of characteristics such as existence of regulatory 
governance, the agency’s experience, and its regulatory governance that regulates the 
utility   of country 
t
i j  at time t. Hence, β  will capture the effect of the private sector 
participation on the outcome of interest and δ  will capture the effect of regulation on the 
outcomes. Then, γ  will capture the interaction between private sector participation and 
the regulation. Several factors may affect this, such as initial conditions and geography. 
Hence, it is important to control for the firm’s specific fixed effects to capture the 
characteristics of the firm not observed by the econometrician. Therefore  ij φ   captures 
fixed effects defined by Dij.   
 
A second version of equation (1) may also be estimated, introducing a firm-specific time 
trend:  
 




ij ij ij ij ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt t D X PRIV X PRIV y υ θ φ γ δ β ) * ( * * ln 0   (2) 
 
Equation (2) contains the same dependent variables, dummies and control variables used 
in the static model, but will include a coefficient that will capture the time trends specific 
for each utility of the variable of interest. As was described by Andres et al. (2007a), it is 
important to account for these effects since the omission of these factors may cause 
erroneous results. For instance, coverage in LAC presents, in general, a natural trend. 
Ideally speaking, in order to identify an effect in the variable, we would like to get a 
significant break in this trend. If there is no such break and equation (1) is applied, under 
the presence of a positive trend, it is likely that the dummies will result with significant 
and positive coefficients. When equation (2) is estimated, these trends are corrected and 
the dummies should be read as an average break in the trend. These effects will be 
captured by  ij θ  . 
 
Most of the literature reviewed uses a basic approach similar to that in equation (1), and 
in some cases accounts for specifications like those included in equation (2). In other 
words, the utility is evaluated immediately before and after the change in ownership. This 
approach does not account for changes that may occur in preparation for the change in 
ownership or in response to it, perhaps through one-time decisions (e.g. a reduction in 
personnel). In this paper, in order to isolate and identify the outcomes during the period 
around the change in ownership, specific dummies are defined for these transitional 
years. For these, the analysis will split the data into three main periods: First, the “pure 
public” period, covering the years before transition; second, the “transition” period, 
starting when the reform was announced and ending one year after the concession or 
privatization was awarded; and third, the years after the transition, or the “pure private” 
period. As will be described later, the transition period has some important effects on 
  - 11 -firms. Since it is not clear for all the cases when the process to change ownership was 
announced, we will assume that it started two years prior to the date of the award.
4 
Therefore, we can define a dummy for the transition and a dummy for the post-transition 
period, so that equations (1) and (2) become: 
 
()
∑ + + +
+ + + + =
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where   is a time trend that has a value equal to zero for the year when the privatization 
or concession was awarded. In this sense, the first dummy will identify the average 
change in the dependent variable during the transition with respect to the average level 
prior to the transition years, during the pure public period. The second dummy will 
identify the average change of the dependent variable after the transition with respect to 
the transition period. 
ijt s
 
The first basic specification will be equation (3) using the log level of the indicators. In 
particular, this will help to identify most of the conclusions. For those variables that 
present trends (for instance, number of connections), equation (4) will be more 
enlightening. However, it relies on the assumption that trends among the three periods of 
analysis are the same.  
 
Given the fact that we are using a semi-logarithmic functional form of these models for 
each of the indicators, it should be remembered that the percentage impact in each 
indicator is given by   (Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980) when interpreting the 




In order to correct for potential non-spherical errors, a Generalized Least Square (GLS) 
approach would be appropriate. However, the GLS estimation requires knowledge of the 
unconditional variance matrix of  ijt υ ,  Ω, up to scale. Hence, we must be able to write 
, where C is a known GxG positive definite matrix. But, in this case, as this 
matrix is not known, we will follow a Feasible GLS (FGLS) approach that replaces the 
unknown matrix Ω with a consistent estimator. 
C
2 σ = Ω
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4 We have performed a review of this arbitrary period definition with several country analysts, and this 




We work with two unique databases. In terms of performance, we use the Electricity 
Benchmarking data (World Bank, 2007). This benchmarking initiative contributes 
primarily with the collection and analysis of detailed data for 26 countries and 250 
utilities that represent 88 percent of the electricity connections in the Latin American and 
Caribbean region. Through in-house and field data collection, this work compiled data on 
the electricity distribution sector based on accomplishments in output, coverage, labor 
productivity, input, operating performance, service quality, and tariffs. Based on the 
results of these performance indicators, the World Bank (2007) benchmarks the 
performance of electricity distribution at the regional, country, and utility-level. Among 
the utilities in this database we selected those utilities that had a change in ownership 
and/or present a regulatory agency. Out of the 250 utilities 216 were retained. The 
definitions of the variables selected for this report can be found in Annex 1. 
 
For the data on regulatory governance we used the one collected in our previous work 
Andres et al. (2007). As previously stated, we designed a survey that was distributed to 
all electricity regulatory agencies in the region, including not only national but also 
provincial or state regulators (particularly in the cases of Argentina and Brazil). The 
questionnaire was composed of 97 questions (for the full version of the survey, see 
Appendix 1 in Andres et al. 2007b) reflecting the 4 variables of agencies’ governance 
and both formal and informal aspects of their functioning. We also included a general 
section aimed at capturing characteristics of electricity markets such as the methodology 
for tariff calculation, the degree of market liberalization, and social tariffs. We received 
responses from 43 electricity regulatory agencies, whose coverage in terms of electricity 
consumers exceeds 90 percent of the region. Annex 2 presents the list of the national 
regulatory agencies with some selected characteristics.  
 
Each country or state was represented by its own regulatory agency, with the exception of 
Colombia and Chile, for which we assigned unique values since they each have two 
different agencies with regulatory functions. In both Colombia and Chile, regulatory 
responsibilities are shared between a National Energy Commission in charge of the main 
regulatory aspects (tariffs, approval of contracts) and an Oversight Electricity Agency (in 
the case of Chile, the Superintendencia de Electricidad y Combustibles and in the case of 
Colombia, the Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos) in charge of the sector’s oversight 
(service quality, sanctions’ enforcing, consumer complaints). Considering that both 
agencies perform different tasks that in other countries are undertaken by only one 
regulator, we “merged” both administrative bodies and assigned a unique value for the 
country. For those institutional aspects that should be reflected in both agencies, such as 
the independence of their decision-making (e.g.. the appointment of directors) or the 
transparency of their management (e.g. account audits), we assigned the country an 
average score calculated from both agencies’ scores on the same question. For instance, if 
the Comisión Nacional de Energía of Chile was assigned 0 for not auditing its accounts 
and the Superintendencia de Electricidad y Combustibles was assigned 1 for auditing its 
accounts, then Chile would obtain 0.5 in that question. In those aspects where the 
agencies had separate responsibilities (e.g. the regulation of tariffs by the Comisión 
Reguladora de la Energía of Colombia and the reception of consumers’ claims by the 
Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos), we assigned the country the score achieved by 
the agency with responsibility in that issue, regardless of the score obtained by the other 
agency for the same issue. Table 2 presents the summary statistics. 
  
TABLE 2: Summary Statistics of the regulatory Governance Database 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Formal Autonomy 40 0.780 0.120 0.386 0.939
Informal Autonomy 40 0.800 0.115 0.400 0.950
Formal Transparency 40 0.755 0.142 0.500 1.000
Informal Transparency 40 0.652 0.158 0.200 0.909
Informal accountability 40 0.817 0.153 0.500 1.000
Formal accountability 40 0.522 0.197 0.100 0.950
Tools/Capacities 40 0.623 0.171 0.315 0.936
ERGI 40 0.707 0.105 0.474 0.889  





This section describes the results with different specifications. As stated above, all the 
specifications were run using a semi-logarithmic functional form of these models for each 
of the indicators. It should be remembered that the percentage impact in each indicator is 
given by    when interpreting the coefficient estimates of the dummy.  1 −
δ e
 
First, we describe the results when only the change-in-ownership variables are included. 
Then we included a dummy for the existence of a regulatory agency as well as it 
interactions with the ownership dummies. After this, we included a quadratic form of 
experience of the regulatory agency. Following this, we introduced the ERGI in the 
specifications as well as its interactions with the ownership. Finally, we decomposed the 
regulatory index through a Principal Component approach and obtained three principal 
components that are introduced in the models. 
 
 6.1. Change in Ownership 
 
We first explored the impact on performance of private sector participation. We do this 
because, together with the introduction of regulatory agencies, private participation was 
the main change in the sector. As described in Andres et al. (2007a) and World Bank 
(2007), by 1993 only 3 percent of the total connections were in private hands. In contrast, 
by 2005, 61 percent of them were under private management. 
 
Table 3 presents the results. Consistently with Andres et al. (2006), private sector 
participation exhibits significant effects in labor productivity, reduction of distributional 
losses, improvement in the quality of the service, reduction of the operational 
expenditures, increment in tariffs, and improvement in the cost recovery ratio. However, 
most of these changes occurred during the transition period. Despite this, some additional 
improvements happened after this period. Not surprisingly, coverage of the service, when 
the estimation accounts for utility specific time trends, presents no significant change. 
 




































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dummy Transition of  0.181*** 0.231*** 0.014 -0.008*** 0.047*** -0.124*** -0.063* -0.484** -0.458** 0.113*** 0.037** 0.024
       PSP (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.002) (0.004) (0.027) (0.033) (0.224) (0.230) (0.015) (0.019) (0.059)
Dummy Post Transition 0.067*** 0.024** -0.141*** 0.004*** -0.002 -0.356*** -0.396*** -0.216*** -0.175*** 0.013 -0.044** 0.194***
       of PSP (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.001) (0.005) (0.022) (0.021) (0.038) (0.046) (0.010) (0.020) (0.050)
Utility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Utility Specific
     Time trend Y e s Y e s N o Y e s N oN oN oN oN oN oN oN o
Observations 2000 1981 2073 1323 2515 1056 947 864 873 1728 840 669
Number of utilities 199 198 190 144 213 144 132 131 131 175 90 103
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
  - 15 -  - 16 -
                                                
 
More specifically, labor productivity rose between 19.8 and 26.0 percent during the 
transition. After this period, an additional increase was observed between 2.4 and 6.9 
percent with respect to the transition levels. This is a consequence of a significant 
reduction in the labor force as well as the natural positive trends that were observed in 
terms of the number of connections as well as their total consumption. Consistent with 
previous analyses, distributional losses have decreased significantly after the transition, 
resulting in a 13.2 percent reduction. As it is well understood in the sector, most of the 
improvements in this area have responded to investments in the network in order to 
reduce the technical losses as well as improvements in the cadastres and monitoring in 
order to limit the commercial losses. In general, these improvements are observed at least 
one year after the change; hence, it is expected to find no significant impact during the 
transition and a significant one afterwards. Quality of the service, measured as duration 
and frequency of the interruptions presents significant reductions in both indicators 
during and the transition. During the former, a 11.7 and 6.1 percent reduction was 
observed for duration and frequency. After the transition, an improvement of 30.0 and 
32.7 percent was observed, respectively. Similar to the case of distributional losses, the 
quality of service measured as the duration of interruptions may be improved with better 
management, whereas significant improvements in the frequency of interruptions require 
investments in the network.  
 
With regards to operational expenditure per MWH sold, the amount was halved; possibly 
achieved with the reduction of the number of employees and its total labor costs, the 
reduction of the cost of the energy bought given the improvements in the generation 
segment, and finally because of some managerial improvements with the introduction of 
the private sector in the utility. Tariffs also presented some increase. While average 
residential tariffs increased by 12.0 percent and industrial ones by 3.8 percent, after the 
transition only industrial tariffs presented a significant change reducing them by 4.3 
percent with respect to the transition. Finally, the cost recovery ratio resulted with a 21.4 
percent improved after the transition indicating more alignment between the cost 
structure and the revenues, given by the average tariffs.          
 
6.2. Existence of a Regulatory Agency 
 
We defined a dummy with a value equal to one starting in the year when the regulatory 
agency was established
5. We ran two different specifications. First, we ran the ownership 
dummies and the one for the existence of a regulatory agency (see Table 4). These 
specifications allowed for the identification of the impact of ownership when we 
controlled by the existence of a regulatory agency and the effect of the existence of 
regulation when we controlled by ownership. In a second set of specifications that was 
run, we interacted the ownership dummies with the one for existence. This allowed us to 
identify some complementarities between both phenomena (see Table 5). 
 
Most of the results regarding the change in ownership from the previous description hold 
when we control by the existence of a regulatory agency; however, their magnitude is 
slightly reduced. For instance, the effect on labor productivity is reduced by one fourth. 
Similar to the quality of the service, the result during the transition becomes non-
significant. On the contrary, the results for the post transition remain significant with a 10 
and 17 percent reduction of the impact of the change in ownership, with respect to the 
results previously described when we did not account for the existence of an agency. 
 
5 Note that there are some differences between when the agency was created (in general by law) with respect 
the years when it was established. The governance data reported both dates. Despite we selected the year 
when it was established we run similar specifications with the year of creation and we obtained similar 
































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dummy Transition of  0.131*** 0.169*** 0.043*** -0.011*** 0.065*** -0.014 0.032 -0.314 -0.352 0.042** 0.064*** -0.005
       PSP (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.002) (0.003) (0.032) (0.037) (0.223) (0.224) (0.019) (0.023) (0.059)
Dummy Post Transition 0.045*** 0.015 -0.131*** 0.003* 0.003 -0.295*** -0.348*** -0.142*** -0.089** -0.019** -0.031 0.192***
       of PSP (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.002) (0.005) (0.024) (0.023) (0.034) (0.036) (0.009) (0.021) (0.050)
Existence of Regulatory 0.177*** 0.167*** -0.045*** 0.004* -0.031*** -0.210*** -0.190*** -0.387*** -0.320*** 0.145*** -0.047** 0.125***
       Agency (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005) (0.028) (0.029) (0.051) (0.056) (0.016) (0.021) (0.032)
Utility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Utility Specific
     Time trend Y e s Y e s N o Y e s N oN oN oN oN oN oN oN o
Observations 2000 1981 2073 1323 2515 1056 947 864 873 1728 840 669
Number of utilities 199 198 190 144 213 144 132 131 131 175 90 103
Standard errors in parentheses

































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dummy Transition of  0.121*** 0.170*** 0.125*** -0.012*** 0.057*** -0.018 0.059 -0.278 -0.230 0.164*** 0.055 -0.053
       PSP (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.003) (0.008) (0.040) (0.046) (0.228) (0.229) (0.024) (0.039) (0.107)
Dummy Post Transition 0.018 -0.020 -0.123*** 0.006 0.095*** -0.561*** -0.429*** -0.110 -0.116 -0.087*** 0.123 0.308***
       of PSP (0.015) (0.025) (0.035) (0.004) (0.015) (0.074) (0.064) (0.102) (0.099) (0.018) (0.100) (0.116)
Existence of Regulatory 0.162*** 0.175*** -0.008 0.002 -0.023*** -0.239*** -0.176*** -0.351*** -0.233*** 0.286*** -0.039 0.146***
       Agency (0.014) (0.017) (0.010) (0.002) (0.006) (0.038) (0.044) (0.069) (0.078) (0.024) (0.026) (0.042)
Transition * Existence 0.026 -0.012 -0.144*** 0.004 0.005 0.019 -0.061 -0.016 -0.150 -0.315*** 0.000 0.045
(0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.004) (0.011) (0.054) (0.059) (0.121) (0.129) (0.033) (0.045) (0.114)
Post Trans. * Existence 0.032* 0.041 0.020 -0.005 -0.102*** 0.284*** 0.107 -0.071 0.006 0.138*** -0.158 -0.123
(0.017) (0.026) (0.037) (0.005) (0.016) (0.078) (0.069) (0.109) (0.108) (0.021) (0.102) (0.121)
Utility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Utility Specific
     Time trend Y e s Y e s N o Y e s N oN oN oN oN oN oN oN o
Observations 2000 1981 2073 1323 2515 1056 947 864 873 1728 840 669
Number of utilities 199 198 190 144 213 144 132 131 131 175 90 103
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
  - 17 -  - 18 -
With respect to the existence of a regulatory agency when we controlled by change in 
ownership we found a significant and desirable impact in most of the indicators. For 
instance, under the presence of a regulatory agency, utilities resulted with 19.4 and 18.2 
percent higher labor productivity. Similarly, utilities reported 18.9 percent less average 
duration and 17.3 percent less frequency of interruptions. With respect to operational 
expenditures, utilities regulated by an agency resulted between 27.4 and 32.1 percent less 
expenditures. Residential tariffs reported a 13.5 percent increase under the presence of a 
regulatory agency while industrial ones presented a 4.6 percent reduction. Consistent 
with the previous results, the cost recovery ratio resulted significantly higher with 13.3 
percent. 
 
6.3. Experience of the Regulatory Agency 
 
We defined an experience variable as the years since the establishment of the regulatory 
agency. We argue that agencies can learn “by doing” in order to obtain the desired 
outcomes. We assumed a quadratic form for this experience acquisition. As expected, 
these results are correlated with the ones with the existence of a regulatory agency. 
However, these estimations support the hypothesis of gradual improvements of utilities’ 
performance under the presence of regulatory agencies. 
 
As before, most of the results on the change in ownership from the previous description 
hold when we control by the experience of a regulatory agency; however, we also 
observed reductions in the magnitude of their effect when we introduced experience 
variables in the model. The linear coefficient of experience variables resulted significant 
and with the expected signs in all the models. For instance, after controlling for the 
change in ownership, utilities resulted with 1.4 additional increments per year in labor 
productivity. Similarly, distributional losses and average consumption per connection 
reported a 1.8 percent reduction per year. Both quality indicators resulted with an annual 
improvement of 9.0 percent. Operational expenditures presented between 1.6 and 5.5 
percent per year. Consistent with the previous results, residential tariffs reported an 
increase of 2.6 percent per year while industrial ones reported a 1.3 percent annual 


































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Dummy Transition of  0.175*** 0.030*** -0.013*** 0.062*** -0.022 0.044 -0.463** -0.451** 0.053*** 0.027 0.043
       PSP (0.014) (0.011) (0.002) (0.005) (0.027) (0.033) (0.220) (0.228) (0.016) (0.019) (0.059)
Dummy Post Transition 0.101*** -0.091*** 0.006*** 0.024*** -0.112*** -0.167*** -0.152*** -0.158*** -0.089*** -0.058*** 0.157***
       of PSP (0.008) (0.012) (0.002) (0.006) (0.025) (0.024) (0.036) (0.046) (0.011) (0.021) (0.049)
Duration of the Regulat. -0.014*** -0.018*** 0.004*** -0.018*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.057*** -0.016*** 0.026*** -0.013*** 0.040***
      Agency (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Duration of the Regulat. -0.000 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** -0.001***
      Agency (Sq.) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Utility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Utility Specific
     Time trend Yes No Yes No No No No No No No No
Observations 2000 2073 1323 2515 1056 947 864 873 1728 840 669
Number of utilities 199 190 144 213 144 132 131 131 175 90 103
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
  - 19 -  - 20 -
 
6.4. Electricity Regulatory Governance Index 
 
We included in the models the index developed in our previous work. The ERGI was 
defined as an index between zero and one. The average of this index was 0.483 with a 
standard deviation of 0.343. The purpose of these models is to test not just the existence 
of a regulatory agency but also the governance of these agencies. As seen in the previous 
sections, the sole existence of a regulatory agency has a significant impact on 
performance. However, we would like to test if there are additional effects that protrude 
under the presence of an agency with good regulatory governance. For this end, this 
section reports the results with an increase of one standard deviation in governance. Our 
data is cross section; hence, the underlined assumption is that once the agency was 
created it resulted with a similar institutional design and, therefore, its governance is 
assumed constant. 
 
As in the previous sections, most of the results on change in ownership from the previous 
description hold when we control by the regulatory governance of a regulatory agency; 
however, we also observed some reduction in the magnitude of their effect when we 
introduce the ERGI in the model. A standard deviation in the ERGI is associated with a 
8.7 and 9.1 percent additional increase in labor productivity, between a 7.5 and 8.2 
reduction in duration and frequency of interruptions. Furthermore, operational 
expenditures resulted with more than a 10 percent reduction while a 5.7 percent increase 
was observed in residential tariffs. Consequently there was also an improvement in the 




































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dummy Transition of  0.124*** 0.159*** 0.045*** -0.012*** 0.054*** -0.010 0.031 -0.269 -0.293 0.041** 0.070*** -0.006
       PSP (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.003) (0.005) (0.033) (0.038) (0.225) (0.227) (0.018) (0.022) (0.060)
Dummy Post Transition 0.062*** 0.030*** -0.118*** 0.001 -0.007 -0.276*** -0.332*** -0.213*** -0.179*** 0.019 -0.027 0.194***
       of PSP (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.002) (0.005) (0.024) (0.023) (0.036) (0.044) (0.012) (0.021) (0.050)
Regulatory Governace 0.236*** 0.226*** -0.077*** 0.005* -0.029*** -0.274*** -0.248*** -0.495*** -0.373*** 0.154*** -0.074*** 0.150***
      Index (ERGI) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.003) (0.007) (0.036) (0.038) (0.069) (0.076) (0.021) (0.028) (0.042)
Utility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Utility Specific
     Time trend Y e s Y e s N o Y e s N oN oN oN oN oN oN oN o
Observations 1859 1840 1983 1247 2337 1030 924 841 850 1655 831 660
Number of utilities 181 180 175 137 195 139 127 126 126 159 85 98
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
  
  - 21 - 
 
6.5. Governance Principal Components of the Regulatory Agencies 
 
Although the previous section illustrates the impacts of “total” governance on 
performance, it is interesting to disentangle the different aspects of governance. As 
described before, the ERGI was defined as a combination of seven different indicators 
(see section 3). Although each of them had a particular scope and interpretation it is 
likely that some of them behave similarly. This potential collinearity makes it impossible 
to add all these variables in the regressions. Hence, we applied a Principal Component 
approach in order to comprise the eight indicators in the relevant components, thus 
minimizing the lost of information. The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) develops a 
composite index by defining a real valued function over the relevant variables 
objectively. The principle of this method lies in the fact that when different 
characteristics are observed about a set of events, the characteristic with higher variation 
explains a higher proportion of the variation in the dependent variable compared to a 
variable displaying less variation. Therefore, the issue is one of finding weights to be 
assigned to each of the concerned variables determined by the principle that the objective 
is to maximize the variation in the linear composite of these variables. In other words, 
this approach allows for identifying patterns in data, and expressing the data in such a 
way as to highlight their similarities and differences. Since patterns in data can be hard to 
find in data of high dimension, PCA may contribute in analyzing data. Furthermore, an 
additional advantage of PCA is that once you have found these patterns in the data, you 
may compress the data by reducing the dimensions, without much loss of information.   
 
We use PCA to jointly take into account the information provided by our eight main 
governance indicators ratios (Table 8) and generate orthogonal indexes to measure 
regulatory agencies' governance. Factor scores were then calculated for each of the 
agencies. As a first step, we determine how many factors we may use in our analysis. 
Table 8 reports the estimated factors and their eigenvalues. Only those factors accounting 
for greater than 10 percent of the variance (eigenvalues >1) are kept in the analysis. As a 
result, only the first three factors are finally retained.  
 
 
TABLE 8: Eigenvalues of factors 
 
 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor 1 3.75 2.63 0.47 0.47
Factor 2 1.12 0.09 0.14 0.61
Factor 3 1.03 0.25 0.13 0.74
Factor 4 0.78 0.29 0.10 0.83
Factor 5 0.48 0.16 0.06 0.89
Factor 6 0.33 0.03 0.04 0.94
Factor 7 0.29 0.07 0.04 0.97
Factor 8 0.22 . 0.03 1.00  
 
Among them, the first principal component factor (F1) accounts for 47 percent of the 
variance of the seven indexes. The other two component factors (F2 and F3) account for 
14 and 13 percent of the variance respectively. The three factors together account for 74 
of the total variance. These factors allow for computing the factor score coefficient 
matrix. To enhance these factors' interpretability, we use the varimax factor rotation 
method to minimize the number of variables that have high loadings on a factor. In other 
  - 22 -words, varimax rotation produces results which make it the most likely to identify each 
variable with a single factor. This approach greatly enhances our ability to make 
substantive interpretation of the main factors. Table 9 presents the factor loadings, where 
variables with large loadings (N>0.4) for a given factor are highlighted in bold. 
 
TABLE 9: Factor loadings of indexes after varimax rotation 
 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Unexplained
Tariff regulation Index -0.026 -0.085 0.772 0.120
Informal Autonomy Index 0.480 -0.113 0.032 0.541
Informal Transparency Index 0.370 0.288 0.022 0.281
Informal Accountability Index 0.560 -0.011 -0.109 0.384
Tools/Capacities Index 0.561 -0.037 0.062 0.261
Formal Autonomy Index 0.037 0.135 0.621 0.162
Formal Transparency Index 0.003 0.655 -0.040 0.183
Formal Accountability Index -0.051 0.670 0.010 0.171  
 
 
As seen in Table 9, Factor 1 reflects informal governance aspects in a regulatory agency, 
as it is correlated with informal autonomy, informal transparency, informal 
accountability, and tools and capacities. Nevertheless, good informal governance does 
not necessarily imply good overall performance; it may also be a manifestation of the 
agencies behavior as to balance low formal governance. Factor 2 reflects formal aspects 
of regulatory governance and is highly correlated with formal transparency and formal 
accountability. Factor 3 reflects formal aspects of autonomy and the formal power of the 
agency to determine tariff’s structure and level. This factor is highly correlated with the 
Tariff Regulatory index and the Formal Autonomy one.  
 
We included these three factors in the models and the results are presented in Table 10. 
 
As we did for the ERGI, the results may be better interpreted when we compute the 
impact on performance given an increase of one standard deviation for each factor. 
Standard deviations resulted in 1.51, 1.41, and 1.28 for each of the three principal 
components, respectively. Most of the coefficients for the three principal components 
resulted significant and with the expected signs in most of the cases; however, it seems 
that each of them have a distinct effect on each of the performance indicators. For 
instance, a standard deviation in the formal component has a higher effect on improving 
labor productivity by 15.9 percent and reducing frequency of interruptions and the 
residential tariffs by 13.8 and 19.0 percent, respectively. A standard deviation 
improvement in the third component that is related to formal autonomy and the 
attributions of the agency in terms of setting tariffs is associated with higher labor 
productivity by 11.4 percent and a 17.2 percent reduction in the average duration of 
interruptions. Furthermore, it produced a reduction in operation expenditure between 42.8 
and 49.3 percent with consequent improvements in the cost recovery ratio. Finally, the 
first component resulted with less influence given that only three out of eleven 
coefficients resulted significant.  

































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Dummy Transition of  0.122*** 0.027** -0.014*** 0.059*** -0.043 0.046 -0.730* -0.808** 0.147*** 0.087*** 0.068
       PSP (0.012) (0.013) (0.003) (0.004) (0.037) (0.044) (0.397) (0.400) (0.019) (0.021) (0.062)
Dummy Post Transition 0.084*** -0.124*** 0.002 -0.008 -0.358*** -0.366*** -0.193*** -0.137*** 0.049*** -0.016 0.176***
       of PSP (0.008) (0.013) (0.002) (0.005) (0.025) (0.024) (0.039) (0.049) (0.013) (0.021) (0.053)
PCA 1 - Informal 0.001 -0.027*** -0.001 -0.048*** 0.014 0.010 0.046 0.053 0.087*** 0.010 -0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.004) (0.018) (0.018) (0.042) (0.050) (0.010) (0.021) (0.018)
PCA 2 - Formal 0.107*** -0.006 0.004* 0.037*** -0.024 -0.103*** 0.050 0.092 -0.145*** -0.051*** -0.071*
(0.008) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.026) (0.028) (0.084) (0.085) (0.014) (0.016) (0.037)
PCA 3 - Formal Autonomy 0.085*** -0.069*** 0.012*** -0.009 -0.144*** -0.080 -0.405*** -0.339** -0.036* -0.030 0.266***
     and Tariffs (0.015) (0.012) (0.004) (0.009) (0.053) (0.049) (0.111) (0.132) (0.020) (0.029) (0.068)
Utility FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Utility Specific
     Time trend Yes No Yes No No No No No No No No
Observations 1782 1917 1190 2253 974 882 800 809 1596 820 619
Number of utilities 175 169 131 189 134 123 121 121 153 84 93
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 





This paper contributes to the literature that explores the link between regulatory 
governance and sector performance. We develop indexes of regulatory governance and 
using cross country data about regulatory agencies and sector performance, we have 
shown that regulation matters and in particular that the governance structure of regulatory 
agencies matters significantly. We use two unique databases: (i) the World Bank’s 
recently published Electricity Performance Database (World Bank, 2007) that contains 
detailed data for 26 countries and 250 utilities that represent 88 percent of the electricity 
connections in the Latin American and Caribbean region. The compiled data on the 
electricity distribution sector includes information on output, coverage, labor 
productivity, input, operating performance, service quality, and tariffs; and (ii) we have 
used also Electricity Regulatory Governance Database (Andres et al. (2007b) for the 
development of the governance indexes. Based on an analytical framework to assess the 
governance of electricity agencies we designed a survey which was submitted to most of 
the regulatory agencies of the LAC region. The questionnaire was composed of 97 
questions reflecting the four variables of agencies’ governance and both formal and 
informal aspects of their functioning. 
 
In assessing this relationship, we developed a methodology where we ran different 
models to explain the impacts of the change in ownership and different characteristics of 
the regulatory agency on the performance of the utilities. The results suggest that the 
mere existence of a regulatory agency, independent of the utilities’ ownership has a 
significant impact on performance. Furthermore, after controlling for the existence of a 
regulatory agency, the ownership dummies are still significant and with the expected 
signs. We also proposed an experience measure in order to identify the gradual impact of 
the regulatory agency on utility performance. Our results confirm this hypothesis. In 
addition, this paper explores two different measures of governance; we used the ERGI, an 
aggregated measure of regulatory governance and then we decomposed the regulatory 
governance indexes into three main principal components related to informal and formal 
aspects of the agencies’ governance, also considering the regulation of tariffs by agencies 
as an independent variable of their governance. The results suggest that governance 
matters and has significant impacts on performance when we simulated a standard 
deviation in each of these indexes. 
 
In summary, we have shown that regulation matters for sector performance, on three 
aspects. We have shown that the existence of a regulatory agency matters, that the 
experience of the regulatory agency matters and that its governance matters as well. The 
results are consistent with the literature on the impact of private sector participation and 
show the relevance of the existence of a regulatory agency and its governance, defined as 
the agency’s institutional design and structure that allows it to carry its functions as an 
independent regulator. Our results indicate a significant improvement in utility 
performance through the involvement of a regulatory agency even in the case of state 
owned enterprises. The results strongly support that the highest achievements are reached 
with the combination of private sector participation regulated through a regulatory 
agency that exhibits good governance. 
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ANNEX 1: List of selected variables of performance 
# Name  Unit  Definition 
1 Number  of  Connections  Number  Total number of residential connections in the 
utility area 
2  Energy Sold  MWh  Total electricity sold per year 
3  Average consumption  MWh  Energy sold per connection per year 
4  Employees  Number  Total number of employees 
5  Labor productivity (1)  Number  Ratio total connections per employee 
6  Labor productivity (2)  MWh  Ratio energy sold per employee 
7 OPEX  Dollars  OPEX (operation expenditures) of the distribution 
services per connection. 
8 OPEX  per  connection  Dollars  Ratio 
9  OPEX per MWh sold  Dollar  Ratio 
10 Distributional  Losses  %  Energy losses in distribution per year (due to 
technical losses and illegal connections) 
11  Quality (1)  Hours/year  Average duration of interruptions per subscriber 
12  Quality (2)  #/Year  Average frequency of interruptions per subscriber 
13 Coverage  % 
Number of residential subscribers per 100 
households in the concession area (Residential 
coverage) 
14  Average residential tariff  Dollars/MWh   
15  Average industrial tariff  Dollars/MWh   
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ANNEX 2: Selected characteristics of LAC national electricity agencies that submitted the survey 
 
Name Year  Legal  status  Budget 
sources  Appeals’ authority  Accountability  Staff 
number 
Ente Nacional Regulador 
de la Electricidad 
(Argentina) 
1993 
Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 












Separate entity with 





Judicial review  Executive and 
Congress  29 
Superintendencia de 
Electricidad (Bolivia)  1996 
Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 
Regulation tax  Judicial review  Executive and 
Congress  68 
Agencia Nacional de 
Energía Eléctrica (Brazil)  1997 
Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 
Regulation tax  Judicial review  Executive and 
Congress  765 
Comisión de Regulación 
de Energía y Gas 
(Colombia) 
1994 
A separate entity 
with no autonomy 
from the line ministry 
Regulation tax  Judicial review  Executive and 
Congress 






A separate entity 
with autonomy from 
the line ministry 
Government 
budget  Judicial review  Executive and 
Congress  305 
Unidad Reguladora de 
Servicios Públicos (Costa 
Rica) 
1996 
Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 
Regulation tax  Judicial review  Congress  167 
Comisión Nacional de 
Energía (Chile)  1978 
Separate entity with 
no autonomy from 











Separate entity with 







Government  More than 
100 
Consejo Nacional de 
Electricidad (Ecuador)  1999 
Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 





Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 











Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 
Regulation tax  Judicial review  Government and 
Congress  106 




Separate entity with 
no autonomy from 
the line ministry 




From 51 to 
100 
Comisión Nacional de 
Energía (Honduras) 
1995 
Separate entity with 
autonony from the 
line ministry 
Government 




                                                 
6 Executive review generally involves the line minister or the President as the authorities in charge of reviewing an 
agency’s decision. Judicial review implies the revision of the decision by a court.   - 31 -
Office of Utilities 
Regulation (Jamaica)  1997 
Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 
No answer  Judicial review  Government and 
Congress  45 
Comisión Reguladora de 
Energía (México) 
1995 
Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 
Government 
budget  Judicial review  Government and 
Congress  130 
Instituto Nicaragüense de 
Electricidad (Nicaragua)  1994 
Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 
Regulation tax  Judicial review  Government and 
Congress  200 
Autoridad Nacional de 
los Servicios Públicos 
(Panamá) 
1996 
Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 
Regulation tax  Judicial review  Government  More than 
100 
Organismo Supervisor de 
la Inversión en Energía 
(Perú) 
1996 
Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 
Regulation tax  Judicial review  Government and 





Separate entity with 
autonomy from the 
line ministry 




Unidad Reguladora de 
Servicios de Energía y 
Agua (Uruguay) 
2000 
Separate entity with 
no autonomy from 
the line ministry 
Regulation tax  Executive and 
Judicial review 
Government and 
Congress  18 
 
 
 